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Abstract
Previous studies have found that self-employed workers with long busi-
ness tenure earn less than other workers with similar characteristics. This
difference in earnings can be explained by the compensating wage differential
theory when self-employed jobs have attractive non-earnings aspects. Using
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 79 (NLSY79), I test whether
moves in and out of self-employment are associated with changes in recorded
job satisfaction scores. By looking at changes in individualsf job satisfaction
over time, I overcome the difficulty of interpreting differences in subjective job
satisfaction scores across individuals associated with cross-sectional analysis.
Using my estimates, I calculate the monetary value of the non-pecuniary as-
pects of self-employment and find that the value of self-employment in terms
of job satisfaction is sufficiently high enough to support the compensating dif-
ferential hypothesis as an explanation for lower earnings among self-employed
workers.
1 Introduction
Self-employed workers comprised 10.5% of the total U.S. workforce in March
1996.1 Despite this large share of self-employed workers, self-employment has
not attracted much attention among labor economists until recently, and the
workings of the labor market among self-employed workers are still largely
unknown. One of the remaining puzzles about self-employed workers is their
lower earnings, which this paper attempts to explain with the compensating
wage differential theory. The compensating differential theory predicts lower
earnings among self-employed workers when non-earnings aspects of self-
employed jobs positively affect workers’ utility. This paper directly tests the
theory using job satisfaction scores available in the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth 79 (NLSY79).
Several studies report lower earnings among self-employed workers as
compared with their salaried and wage-earning counterparts. For example,
Hamilton [2000] found that self-employed workers earn less than salary/wage
workers with similar observable qualifications, using several measures of self-
employed workers’ earnings available in the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) 1984 panel. These lower earnings are mainly due to a
lower growth in earnings among self-employed workers. According to Hamil-
ton’s findings, on average, self-employed workers with 10 years of business
tenure earn 19% less than salary/wage workers with the same amount of
1For recent trends of self-employment in the U.S., refer to Manser and Picot [1999].
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work experience. Lower earnings growth among self-employed workers was
also found by Lazear and Moore [1984]. Krashinski [2000] found 10 to 30%
lower median earnings among self-employed workers, except for college grad-
uates, after controlling for observable workers’ characteristics, using CPS files
over the period of 1979 - 1992. Carrington et al. [1996] also found similar
earnings differences using the Current Population Survey (CPS) March files
between 1967 and 1992.
These observed lower median and mean earnings among self-employed
workers are rather puzzling, however, considering the self-employed workers’
labor income risk as reported by Carrington et al. [1996].2 They found that
self-employed workers’ labor earnings are three times as sensitive to macro
aggregates as salary/wage workers’ and concluded that the labor earnings of
self-employed workers are much more pro-cyclical. In addition, self-employed
workers tend to use their own assets as capital for their businesses due to
liquidity constraints (Evans and Jovanovic [1989]) and, as a result, their la-
bor earnings and asset income tend to co-move. This co-movement makes it
difficult for self-employed workers to insure their future consumption, com-
pared with wage/salary workers who can insure this by saving in a safe
asset. In addition, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen [2001] showed that
self-employed workers tend to invest a large portion of their assets in their
own businesses. As a result, self-employed workers’ portfolios are riskier
2Labor income risk among self-employed workers is intuitively appealing, and con-
sequently several theoretical papers employ it as an assumption that characterizes self-
employed jobs. See Kihlstrom and Laffont [1979] and Kanbur [1982] for example.
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than those of salary/wage workers, whose assets are invested in more di-
versified funds. Despite this risk, the average return on portfolios held by
self-employed workers is almost equivalent to the average return on portfolios
held by salary/wage workers. To compensate for this total income risk, at
least at the first glance, the average earnings of self-employed workers should
be higher than that of salary/wage workers. In addition to income risks,
self-employed workers enjoy fewer fringe benefits, such as employer-provided
health insurance, than salary/wage workers, as pointed out by Hamilton
[2000]. Considering the negative aspects of self-employment, the lower earn-
ings of self-employed workers is a puzzle.
Workers’ negative self-selection into self-employment is one possible ex-
planation for these observed lower earnings. If workers with negative, unob-
served characteristics self-select into self-employment, the lower earnings ob-
served among self-employed workers may be due to these negative traits. To
evaluate this possibility, Hamilton [2000] compared the earnings of two groups
of salary/wage workers during a two year period; the first group consisted
of workers who became self-employed workers in the second year, and the
second group consisted of workers who continued to be salary/wage workers.
He did not find any significant difference in salary/wage earnings for these
two groups in the first year and concluded that self-selection does not explain
lower earnings among self-employed workers, since if negative selection into
self-employment occurs then we should observe lower earnings among work-
ers who become self-employed in the second year. Krashinski [2000] did the
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same exercise using matched CPS data for 20 years and found no evidence
of positive or negative selection into self-employment.3 Borjas and Bronars
[1989] even found positive self-selection into self-employment among white
males, using a Heckman-style, self-selection correction method.4 To summa-
rize, previous research shows that negative self-selection into self-employment
does not explain the lower earnings of self-employed workers.
Hamilton [2000] offered compensating differentials as an alternative ex-
planation. He claimed that self-employed workers enjoy non-earnings as-
pects of self-employment, such as being their own boss, and, accordingly,
they accept lower earnings. His claim was not supported by direct empir-
ical evidence, however. In one significant study, Blanchflower and Oswald
[1998] tested compensating differentials for self-employed workers using the
job/life satisfaction variable available in the British National Child Develop-
ment Survey. Using cross section data from 1981 and 1991, they found that
self-employed workers are more satisfied with their job/life than salary/wage
workers. However, as the authors admitted in their paper, there is a possi-
bility that “self-employed people may be intrinsically more optimistic,” and
higher job/life satisfaction among self-employed workers might be due to
3Krashinski [2000] used this finding as evidence that self-employed workers are a good
control group for testing the institutional hypothesis to explain wage inequality during the
1980s and 90s among salary/wage workers because self-employed workers are relatively free
from such institutional factors as minimum wage restrictions and labor union involvement.
4The wife’s educational attainment and the SMSA-level aggregate labor market con-
ditions are used as instruments in the first stage selection equation. The variables are
unemployment rate, population growth rate, crime rate, the level of local government ex-
penditure, and the mean of income and education level. These variables are assumed to
affect the labor market mobility but do not influence the determination of earnings.
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the intrinsic characteristics of self-employed workers. Several psychological
studies, in fact, have revealed that people with positive attitudes toward life
are more likely to be self-employed.5 This problem arises from the interper-
sonal comparison aspect of the job/life satisfaction score that is determined
by subjective perception. This problem can be resolved by considering the
change of job satisfaction associated with changing jobs, because these sat-
isfaction scores are compared within individuals. This possibility, however,
cannot be explored without using panel data. In addition, contrary to the
findings in Blanchflower and Oswald [1998], Clark and Oswald [1994], using a
medical measure of psychiatric health, found that self-employed workers are
more highly stressed than salary/wage workers. Considering the risks that
self-employed workers face, this result is not surprising. Thus, while the ev-
idence for the compensating differential among self-employed workers found
in Blanchflower and Oswald [1998] is very informative, it does not decisively
support the compensating differential hypothesis. This paper attempts to
overcome the limitation of Blanchflower and Oswald [1998] by using panel
data with a subjective job satisfaction measure (National Longitudinal Sur-
vey Youth 79).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 overviews the
use of job satisfaction measures in economics. Section 3 briefly describes
the data and confirms the lower earnings of self-employed workers. Section
4 discusses job satisfaction scores in the data and implements a descriptive
5See Brockhaus and Horwitz [1986] for a review of the literature.
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analysis. Section 5 describes a simple model of the compensating differential
among self-employed workers and estimates the modelfs parameters. Sec-
tion 6 extends the analysis in Section 5, relaxing the imposed assumptions.
Section 7 provides a summary and conclusion.
2 How Economists Have Used
Job Satisfaction Measures
Economists often hesitate to use subjective job-satisfaction measures because
linking these measures with underlying utility is thought to be difficult.6 In
the empirical literature, however, labor economists have made significant
efforts to incorporate job satisfaction measures into economic analyses of
labor market outcomes. Job satisfaction is generally used in two different
ways in economic analyses of labor markets.
The first uses job satisfaction scores as an independent variable to ex-
amine the effect of job satisfaction on economic outcomes. Freeman [1978]
showed that job satisfaction predicts workers’ job quitting behavior fairly
well, even after controlling worker and job characteristics, including their
wages. Carrington et al. [1996] and Clark [2001] obtained similar results
using German and British data respectively. These findings establish that
job satisfaction is a very informative economic variable. The method that
6Job satisfaction is regarded as one of most important concepts by industrial and
organizational psychologists, and textbooks in the field typically devote an entire chapter
to job satisfaction and its effect on job performance. For example, see McCormick and
Ilgen [1985] and Siegel and Lane [1987].
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will be applied to the data set in this study will help determine whether job
satisfaction is a reliable economic variable. The results of the analysis appear
in data section of this paper.
The second set of studies has analyzed the determination of job satisfac-
tion, given that the job satisfaction variable is a reliable economic variable.
For example, the job satisfaction variable has been widely used to exam-
ine the effect of unionism on job satisfaction (Borjas [1979], Leigh [1979] and
Bender and Sloane [1998]). Somewhat surprisingly, researchers typically have
found lower job satisfaction among union as compared with non-union work-
ers. They have offered this counter-intuitive finding as evidence that labor
unions possess an exit-voice mechanism; even though workers are not happy
with their jobs, they do not quit because their “voice” is heard through their
labor union.
Several studies have used job satisfaction scores to test the relative in-
come concern hypothesis; job satisfaction is not only determined by indi-
vidual earnings, but also by the relative position of the individualfs earnings
compared with workers who share similar characteristics (Hamermesh [1977],
Clark and Oswald [1996], Hamermesh [2001]). All of these studies have found
evidence supporting the relative income concern hypothesis.
This review of literature shows that the job satisfaction variable contains
rich information usable by economists.
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3 Data and Lower Earnings among
Self-Employed Workers
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) is used in this study.
The analysis sample consists of observations between 1985 and 1998 that
was restricted to white males in order to be consistent with previous studies
(Hamilton [2000] and Krashinski [2000]). Individuals who work for money
and are out of school are included in the sample. Individuals are dropped
if their job classifications are unknown. The construction of the analysis
sample is tabulated in Table 1.
As the first step of the analysis, the lower earnings of self-employed work-
ers, which have been observed in previous studies, are replicated with this
data. The following wage equation is estimated to see the earnings differen-
tials between self-employed and salary/wage workers.
lnwit = β0 + xitβ1 + β2selfit + selfitxitβ3 + ci + eit , (1)
where wit is hourly rate of earnings,
7 xit is the vector of human capital and
demographic variables, selfit is the dummy that indicates self-employed, ci
7Hourly rate of pay is constructed by the Center for Human Resource Research (CHRR)
based on respondents’ usual earnings (inclusive of tips, overtime, and bonuses, but before
deductions). CHRR requests wages/salaries/tips income and business/firm income along
with other income categories from both wage/salary workers and self-employed workers.
Thus there is less concern that self-employed workers earnings contains capital income,
in addition to labor income, which is the main concern for the measurement of income
among self-employed when CPS is used. Therefore, the measurement of earnings for self-
employed workers in NLSY 79 is as good as those in SIPP that were used in Hamilton
[2000]. Although Hamilton [2000] also used the earnings that include capital gain as an
alternative earnings measure of self-employed workers, I just focus on the labor earnings
of self-employed worker here.
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is unobserved individual heterogeneity, and eit is idiosyncratic error that sat-
isfies E[eit|selfit, xit, ci] = 0. The model is estimated through OLS assuming
[ci|selfit, xit] = 0, and this assumption ensures that self-selection into self-
employment does not occur on the basis of unobserved characteristics. When
the assumption [ci|selfit, xit] = 0 is violated through self-selection based on
unobservables, the OLS estimator is biased. To deal with this possibility, the
model is also estimated through a fixed effects estimation. The fixed effects
estimator is unbiased if eit is strictly exogenous (i.e. E[eit|selfi, xi, ci] = 0,
where selfi = [selfi1, ..., selfiT ], xi = [xi1, ..., xiT ]); thus self-selection into
self-employment based on time-constant unobserved characteristics is al-
lowed.
The differences in earnings between salary/wage and self-employed work-
ers are evaluated at several points during the job market experience and job
(business) tenure.8 The point of evaluation is important, since the life-cycle
earnings profile is much flatter among self-employed workers as pointed out
in Lazear and Moore [1984].
The results of the estimation and the estimated difference of earnings
appear in Table 2. Both the results of OLS and the fixed effects estima-
tion show that the earnings of self-employed workers are higher without job
experience or tenure, as we can see from the positive coefficients for the self-
8Hamilton [2000] evaluated the differences at 10 years of tenure and 20 years of expe-
rience. However, in the sample used in this analysis, only 1.54% of the total sample has
more than 20 years of job experience. Thus the difference was instead evaluated at 10
years of experience. About half of the observations in the total sample has more than 10
years of experience and about 10 % of total sample has more than 10 years of job tenure.
9
employment dummy. However, the earnings-experience/tenure profiles are
flatter for self-employed workers than for salary/wage workers. Because of
the flatter earnings profile, self-employed workers with 10 years of actual job
experience and 10 years of business tenure earn 18% (t = −1.44) less than
salary/wage workers, depending on their educational background and marital
status, according to the OLS result. This result almost directly corresponds
to the 19% self-employment penalty evaluated at 10 years of job (business)
tenure and 20 years of potential experience found by Hamilton [2000] using
labor income as self-employed workers’ earnings.
According to the fixed effects result, however, self-employed workers with
10 years of job actual experience and 10 years of business tenure earn almost
the same amount as salary/wage workers on average. The lower predicted
wage of self-employed workers from OLS estimates than the predicted wage
from FE estimates implies that self-employed workers with 10 years of job
experience and 10 years of business tenure have lower unobserved character-
istics than salary/wage workers with 10 years of job experience and tenure.
This unobservable can be either worker specific or worker-job matching spe-
cific. The difference of the self-selection mechanism based on job matching
quality suggested in Jovanovic [1979] may explain the negative correlation
between unobserved characteristics and self-employment among workers with
10 years of job (business) tenure. Self-employed workers are required to in-
vest in their business at its start up, as previous empirical studies indicate,9
9For example, see Evans and Jovanovic [1989].
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and if this investment is sunk, the self-employed workers are “foot fixed”
to their job because of the capital income flow from their business. On
the other hand, salaried and wage workers are “foot loose” compared with
self-employed workers, since they do not make this type of commitment at
the beginning of their job. Thus self-selection over time based on worker-job
(business) matching quality, which is unknown ex ante, may occur at a faster
rate among salaried workers. This story reconciles the OLS result and the
FE result; however, this story does not explain the lower earnings among
self-employed workers since prospective self-employed workers recognize this
cost of commitment before starting up their business, but they still choose
to be self-employed anyway.
To summarize the findings, self-employed workers earn less mainly due
to a lower return to job experience and job tenure. When the difference
is evaluated at 10 years of job experience and 10 years of job (business)
tenure, self-employed workers earn 18% less than comparable salary/wage
workers on average. Next I attempt to explain this earnings difference with
the compensating earnings differential theory.
4 Job Satisfaction Scores and Descriptive Anal-
ysis
The main survey item used in this study is global job satisfaction. The
question reads
How [do/did] you feel about your job with [name of employer]?
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[Do/Did] you (1) like it very much, (2) like it fairly well, (3) dislike
it somewhat, or (4) dislike it very much?(CODE ONE ONLY.)
The distribution of responses for this question is tabulated in Table 3.
This distribution remains nearly constant over time. Examination of Ta-
ble 3 reveals that about 65% of self-employed workers chose “like it very
much,” while only about 45% of salary/wage workers chose this answer. It
is also notable that only about 3-5% of self-employed workers chose “dis-
like” (“dislike somewhat” and “dislike very much” combined), while about
8-10% of salary/wage workers chose this answer. This rough examination
of the distribution clearly indicates that self-employed workers report more
satisfaction with their jobs. One sensible criticism of the comparison of this
subjective measure between salary/wage and self-employed workers is that
self-employed workers may be overly positive about their jobs since they
are their own employers and they may want to justify themselves (cognitive
dissonance explanation).
Before developing a detailed discussion of the compensating earnings dif-
ferential based on job satisfaction scores, I examine whether this score is
a meaningful economic variable and comparable between salary/wage and
self-employed workers. If the job satisfaction score contains meaningful in-
formation about a worker’s actual job satisfaction, the score should predict
the observed worker’s behavior, in particular, the worker’s future job change.
The concern for cognitive dissonance can be addressed by comparing the re-
lationship of job satisfaction and job change between salary/wage and self-
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employed workers. If cognitive dissonance resulted in higher job satisfaction
among self-employed workers, we should observe more frequent job change
for given level of reported job satisfaction, since self-employed workers report
high job satisfaction while they are actually not satisfied with their job.
Table 4 tabulates the probability of job change between time t and t− 1
classified by the level of job satisfaction at time t− 1. This table clearly tells
us that the worker who dislikes his/her job is more likely to change his/her
job. The tabulation indicates less frequent job change among self-employed
workers who self-report they like their job very much than salary/wage work-
ers with the same response. Although the differences in the distribution for
other job satisfaction categories are not systematic, the difference in the re-
lationship between job satisfaction and job change behavior is not consistent
with the cognitive dissonance explanation for higher job satisfaction among
self-employed workers.
Since the probability of job change may depend on the worker’s demo-
graphic characteristics that may be correlated with job satisfaction, a probit
model in which the probability of job change depends on demographic vari-
ables as well as job satisfaction is estimated. In addition, the effect of job
satisfaction on job change is allowed to be different between salary/wage and
self-employed workers. The results of the probit estimation appear in Table
5, Column 1. The results indicate that those who dislike their jobs very much
are 22% more likely to change their jobs than those who like their jobs very
much. The inclusion of control variables hardly changed the results obtained
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in Table 4. The interaction of lagged self-employment status and job satisfac-
tion indicate that the effect of job satisfaction on job change is not different
between salary/wage and self-employed workers, except for the case of “dis-
like very much.” This exceptional case contradicts the cognitive dissonance
explanation for higher job satisfaction among self-employed workers.
I also tried the specification that included lagged log wage as an inde-
pendent variable, as used in Clark [2001]. The estimated results for this
specification appear in Table 5, Column 2. The results indicate that a 10%
increase in hourly earnings decreases the probability of job change by 0.26%.
The size of this effect is relatively small compared with the effect of job sat-
isfaction on job change. For example, changing job satisfaction from “like
somewhat” to “like very much” decreases the job change probability by 10.8%
(=0.231-0.123). This larger effect of job satisfaction on job change than wage
effect can be explained as follows. If the job match quality is more significant
in job satisfaction determination than in wage determination, job satisfaction
is a more crucial determinant of job change than wage because workers have
a greater chance to improve their job satisfaction but less chance to improve
their wage through job change. This relatively small effect of hourly earnings
on job change compared with job satisfaction was also found in Clark [2001],
although the result in his study was not this extreme. We should also notice
that the size of the coefficients for job satisfaction dummies hardly changed
due to the inclusion of log of hourly earnings.
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The results displayed in Table 4 and Table 5 clearly indicate that the job
satisfaction score contains valuable information about the worker’s actual
satisfaction in his or her job.
One of the main drawbacks of using the job satisfaction score, as noted
in the existing literature, is the difficulty in the interpersonal comparison of
subjective measures. This study attempts to overcome this difficulty by using
panel data because panel data enables the researcher to examine the change
in job satisfaction associated with job change. In the following analysis, the
job satisfaction score is assumed to be comparable within each individual over
time. This assumption is much weaker than the assumption of interpersonal
comparability of subjective measures.
As a simple way to examine the change in job satisfaction associated with
job change, the transition matrices of job satisfaction for job stayers and job
changers appear in Table 6. Findings from these matrices are summarized
as follows:
• Among job stayers, self-employed workers are more likely to stay in
the “like very much” category as compared with wage/salary workers.
(Panel A and Panel B)
• Job changers who move from salary/wage jobs to self-employed jobs are
more likely to experience a positive transition and less likely to experi-
ence a negative transition of job satisfaction than job changers within
salary/wage jobs. It is also notable that job changers’ job satisfaction
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as salary/wage workers are originally slightly higher than stayers’. This
may be evidence of self-selection. (Panel C and Panel E)
• This positive transition of job satisfaction is less likely to occur among
those who change from self-employed jobs to wage/salary jobs. More-
over, about 20% of job changers experience a negative transition of job
satisfaction. (Panel F)
These findings suggest the conclusion that self-employed jobs are more
satisfying than salary/wage jobs. However, other demographic characteristics
that also might affect job satisfaction, such as marital status, may vary at the
time of job change and this might result in the findings above. To address this
possibility, the effects of workers’ observed and unobserved characteristics
on job satisfaction are controlled in the following analysis. In addition, I
attempt to calculate the monetary value of self-employment status in terms
of job satisfaction.
5 Compensating Differentials among
Self-Employed Workers
To test the compensating differential hypothesis among self-employed work-
ers, this section attempts to calculate the monetary value of self-employment
status in terms of job satisfaction to see whether it is large enough to ex-
plain the earnings differential between salary/wage workers and self-employed
workers.
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A straightforward way to see whether the difference in job satisfaction be-
tween self-employed workers and salary/wage workers explains the difference
in earnings is to estimate the following equation:
lnwit = β0 + xitβ1 + β2selfit + β3jsit + eit , (2)
and see whether H0 : β2 = 0 holds. If the null hypothesis is not rejected,
then we can conclude that the difference in earnings originated from job
satisfaction, not from self-employment status. However this obvious method
neglects the fact that job satisfaction is also the function of earnings, as shown
in previous studies. This endogeneity biases the estimates of β3 upward
because jsit and eit are positively correlated. This bias causes a downward
bias in the estimates of β2 since job satisfaction and self-employment status
are positively correlated, as we saw in the previous section. This downward
bias may result in the false acceptance of the null hypothesis. Thus, this
avenue is not pursued in this paper.
Instead, I examine how self-employment status and earnings affect job
satisfaction to see whether the compensating earnings differential explains
lower earnings among self-employed workers. To calculate the monetary value
of self-employment status in terms of job satisfaction, the relative importance
of self-employment status and monetary earnings in the determination of job
satisfaction is examined. The link between the job satisfaction score and
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utility is specified as
jsit =

4 if js∗it ≥ µ3,
3 if µ3 > js
∗
it ≥ µ2,
2 if µ2 > js
∗
it ≥ µ1,
1 if µ1 > js
∗
it,
(3)
where jsit is a categorical variable indicating worker i at time t’s response
to the job satisfaction question (1: “Dislike Very Much” - 4:“Like Very
Much”), whereas js∗it is the latent, continuous variable of job satisfaction
and µk(k = 1, 2, 3) are the thresholds of job satisfaction that determine the
answer for the job satisfaction question. Although many factors may affect
a worker’s job satisfaction, to see the trade-off between self-employment sta-
tus and monetary compensation, those two factors are mainly considered as
the determinants of job satisfaction. To estimate the monetary value of self-
employment status in terms of job satisfaction, three additional assumptions
are imposed.
First, as a shape of the job satisfaction function, a linear function is
assumed as a first order approximation. Several demographic variables are
also assumed to affect job satisfaction. Moreover, unobserved factors that
may affect job satisfaction are assumed to be independent of self-employment
status, wage, and demographic variables, and these factors are assumed to
be normally distributed. This assumption results in
Assumption 1 (Linear job satisfaction function)
js∗it = θ0 + θ1sit + θ2wit + xitθ3 + ci + eit, eit|sit, wit, xit, ci ∼ N(0, 1) , (4)
where sit is the dummy variable for self-employment status, wit is hourly rate
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of pay, xit is the vector of a worker’s attributes, and ci is individual hetero-
geneity in utility level. Specifically xit contains a marital status dummy; a sex
dummy; age and racial or ethnic group dummies; educational background;
labor market experience; and job (business) tenure.
The next step is to calibrate the monetary value of self-employment sta-
tus in terms of job satisfaction. As a measure of monetary value, we can
calculate how much workers can give up in terms of salary/wage earnings in
exchange for one dollar earnings as self-employed workers while keeping their
job satisfaction constant. The α in the following equation gives this ratio of
trade-off:
θ2(αwit) + xitθ3 + ci + eit︸ ︷︷ ︸
js∗ of a salary/wage worker
= θ1 + θ2wit + xitθ3 + ci + eit︸ ︷︷ ︸
js∗ of a self-employed worker
. (5)
When a worker receives α dollars of earnings per hour as a salary/wage
worker, the worker has the same level of job satisfaction when the worker
earns one dollar per hour as a self-employed worker. The solution for the
equation is α = θ1/(θ2 × wit) + 1. In other words, α dollars of earnings as a
salary/wage worker is equivalent to one dollar of earnings as a self-employed
worker. This value evaluated at the mean of wit is reported as a monetary
value of self-employment status in terms of job satisfaction.
To simplify the econometric model, two additional assumptions that will
be relaxed later are made:
Assumption 2 (Independence of Heterogeneity)
ci ⊥ si, wi, xi . (6)
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where si = [si1, si2, ..., siT ], wi = [wi1, wi2, ..., wiT ] and xi = [xi1, xi2, ..., xiT ].
This assumption assures that individual heterogeneity is independent of ob-
servables and that the heterogeneity does not cause any inconsistency of the
pooled, ordered probit estimator.
Assumption 3 (No feedback from current job satisfaction shock to future
self-employment status)
eit|si, wi, xi, ci ∼ N(0, 1) . (7)
This assumption rules out the feedback from current shock on job satisfaction
to future self-employment status or wage through job change, since if the
feedback exists, the distribution of current e depends on future s and w.
These three assumptions result in the pooled, ordered probit model, and
the parameters in (4) can be estimated. To estimate the model, I dropped
the observations whose hourly rate of pay were either above the 99 percentile
or below the 1 percentile in each year, and this sample selection results in
sample (5) in Table 1. Since those who earned extremely high wages and
were extremely satisfied with their jobs could only report “like their job
very much” at the maximum and vice versa for low wage earners, including
those extreme earners would attenuate the coefficient on hourly rate of pay
toward zero, and this would make the estimates of the monetary value of self-
employment status upwardly biased.10 The results of the estimation appear
in Table 7, Column 1 and Column 2. The result that appears in Column 1
10I tried several trimming rules. The results were not essentially changed when I applied
5%-95% or 10%-90% rules.
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is the specification that only includes the self-employment dummy and the
hourly wage as independent variables. The coefficient for self-employment is
0.472. The size of the coefficient is not large enough to change the worker’s
response to the job satisfaction question from “dislike very much” to “like
somewhat” or from “dislike somewhat” to “like very much,” since the critical
values of the ordered probit are -1.710, -0.987, and 0.551. However, the size
of the coefficient is much larger than the coefficient for hourly wage. The
coefficient for hourly wage is 0.037, which is surprisingly small if we compare
this value with the critical values. Due to this small effect of earnings on
job satisfaction, one dollar earnings of self-employed workers are evaluated
as more than two dollars and fifty cents of salary/wage workers’ earnings
evaluated at the mean of hourly wage. This value is large enough to com-
pensate for the lower earnings among self-employed workers, whose earnings
are about 20% lower than salary/wage workers’ when workers have 10 years
of job experience and 10 years tenure.
The results essentially do not change when marital status, educational
attainment, and job experience are included in the specification.
6 Extensions
A surprisingly large estimate of the monetary value of self-employment was
obtained in the previous section. Now, I consider several possible reasons
why the effect of self-employment status on job satisfaction may be overes-
timated. To do so, I will relax the assumptions made so far one by one in
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this section. As partly suggested in the analysis of transition matrices of
job satisfaction, workers who become self-employed seem to have a positive
attitude toward their jobs independent from self-employment status. If this
is the case, the coefficient for self-employed workers was overestimated in
the pooled probit model, since ci and sit are positively correlated. In addi-
tion, if workers with high ability have high expectations for their earnings,
workers with high ability are less happy with their current earnings. As a
result, unobserved heterogeneity and current earnings, which is a proxy for
ability, may be negatively correlated and the coefficient for hourly rate of
pay may be negatively biased. Considering this heterogeneity or other possi-
bilities that unobserved heterogeneity in job satisfaction are dependent upon
observable characteristics, the assumption 2 (Interpersonal comparability of
job satisfaction) is replaced with
Assumption 2’ (the “Fixed Effects” assumption)
ci|si, wi, xi ∼ N(γ1s¯i + γ2w¯i + γ3x¯i, σ2c ). (8)
This assumption allows dependence between ci and si or xi in a restrictive
way,11 where s¯i, w¯i and x¯i are the means of si, wi and xi respectively.
12 The
consistent estimators are obtained through a pooled, ordered probit estima-
tion of the model that includes individual means of independent variables.
The importance of assumption 3 should be emphasized here. If current shock
11Mundlak [1978] proposed a variant of this assumption in a linear regression framework.
12The analysis under this assumption is called a fixed effect analysis because this as-
sumption allows dependent unobserved heterogeneity.
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to job satisfaction, eit, affects the future value of self-employment status or
wage through job change behavior, eit and (s¯i, w¯i) is dependent and a con-
sistent estimator cannot be obtained.
The results of estimation appear in Table 6, Column 3. The coefficient for
self-employment slightly decreases as expected from the positive correlation
of ci and sit. As a result, the calculated monetary value of self-employment
status becomes 251% of hourly wage.
As confirmed in the previous section and in previous studies (Freeman
[1978], Clark et al. [1998] and Clark [2001]), job changes tend to follow low
job satisfaction. In light of this fact, ruling out the feedback from eit to
sit+1 and wit+1 is a strong assumption. In particular, if a salary/wage worker
experiences low job satisfaction because of some shock (after conditioning
on individual heterogeneity) and become a self-employed worker, we tend
to overestimate the effect of self-employment on job satisfaction because a
salary/wage workers with current negative shock is more likely to be self-
employed in the following period. To take care of this possibility, feedback
effects are allowed through the assumption,
Assumption 3’ (Existence of feedback from current shock on job satisfac-
tion to future job change)
eit|si, xi, ai ∼ N(δ0sit+1 + δ1wit+1, 1), (9)
This model allows feedback from current shock to future self-employment
status and wage in t + 1. The model is estimated with a pooled, ordered
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probit model with an individual mean of independent variables, sit+1 and
wit+1 as independent variables.
The estimated results of the “fixed effects” probit model with feedback
effects appear in Table 7, Columns (4). Neither of the estimated coefficients
for the feedback terms is significant. Since the coefficients for the feedback
terms are not significantly different from zero, I take the fixed effects estimate,
which is αˆ = 2.510(s.e. = 0.362), as the most preferable estimate for the
monetary value of self-employment status in terms of job satisfaction.
Now, the very high valuation of self-employment status is the puzzle that
should be explained. Although self-employed workers with 10 years of job
experience and 10 years of business tenure earn about 20% less than their
salaried/wage-earning counterparts, the estimated results imply that one dol-
lar of earnings as a self-employed worker is equivalent to about 2.5 dollars
earned as a salary/wage worker in terms of job satisfaction.13 If we consider
job satisfaction as equivalent to utility, this value means that self-employed
workers do not move to salary/wage jobs even when they are offered 2.5 times
more than their current earnings. While this finding is counterintuitive, there
are four explanations that may account for these surprising findings.
The first is the fact that job satisfaction is only a segment of utility
function. Suppose the simplest form of utility function, which consists of
13Although I tried several specifications in which the monetary value depended on job
experience and tenure, the result essentially did not change.
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only consumption and job satisfaction:
u(c(w), js(se, w)) , (10)
where c is consumption that is presumably a function of earnings. Then the
monetary value of self-employment is the β in the following equation:
u(w, js(se = 1, w)) = u(βw, js(se = 0, βw)). (11)
However, the monetary value of self-employment status in terms of job sat-
isfaction, which is the α in the equation:
js(se = 1, w) = js(se = 0, αw), (12)
has been estimated in this paper. Ideally, the monetary value of self-employment
status in terms of utility should be estimated to appraise the validity of the
compensating differential hypothesis. Regardless of this limitation, calculat-
ing the monetary value of self-employment status in terms of job satisfaction
is a useful exercise in light of the reality that a numerical measure of utility
is not available.
The second explanation concerns the overestimation of success among
self-employed workers. Empirical studies have found that self-employed work-
ers are overly confident in their future success as compared with salary/wage
workers (Cooper et al. [1988] and Arabsheibani et al. [2000]). For example,
Arabsheibani et al. [2000] report that self-employed workers expect better
financial outcomes in the following year than salary/wage do, even though
they, in fact, experience worse outcomes. When self-employed workers expect
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future monetary success, self-employment status has a subjective “option”
value for future earnings and this option value may make self-employed work-
ers more satisfied with their jobs. Although this effect is attributed to the
non-monetary value of self-employment status in this study, it instead should
be attributed to the monetary value of self-employment status. This overesti-
mation of the non-monetary aspect and underestimation of the monetary as-
pect result in an overestimation of the non-monetary aspect of self-employed
jobs in terms of job satisfaction.
The third explanation relates to underreporting in self-employed work-
ers’ earnings; if this is the case, the value of self-employment is overesti-
mated, since the utility from underreported earnings is captured through
self-employment status. Although NLSY makes good efforts to collect reli-
able labor income from self-employed workers, many may refer to their tax
forms when they answer earnings questions. In many cases, self-employed
workers may have underreported income on their tax forms in the previous
year, so these numbers may be inaccurate. For example, Joulfaian and Rider
[1998] show that the underreport rate of self-employed earnings is about 20%
on average, using the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program.14 Also,
self-employed workers may consume out of business expenses. For example,
they may drive company-owned cars for personal purposes. This also may
increase the monetary value of self-employment status, but it should not be
14The Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program data are stratified samples of in-
dividual tax returns subject to intensive line-by-line examinations (Joulfaian and Rider
[1998]).
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interpreted as a compensating differential since it simply captures consump-
tion.
The fourth explanation relates to heterogeneity in the marginal job satis-
faction from self-employment. When heterogeneity is explicitly modeled, the
utility function becomes
js∗it = θ0 + θ1isit + θ2wit + xitθ3 + ci + eit,
= θ0 + θ¯1sit + θ2wit + xitθ3 + ci + vit,
vit|sit, wit, xit, ci ∼ N((θ1i − θ¯1)sit, σv). (13)
Marginal job satisfaction and self-employment, θ1i and sit, are likely to be
positive correlated since those who derive greater job satisfaction from self-
employment are more likely to be self-employed. Consequently, sit and the er-
ror term are positively correlated and plimˆ¯θ1 > θ¯1. Thus the pooled, ordered
probit estimator overestimates the average of θ1i over individuals. This pos-
itive correlation can be very large for workers who want to be self-employed
at any cost. Thus the calculated monetary value of self-employment from
the pooled probit model can be interpreted as the upper bound of the aver-
age evaluation of self-employment throughout the population. In addition,
the entry to self-employment continues as long as a worker’s evaluation of
self-employment status is above the earnings penalty of self-employed work-
ers. Thus, the earnings penalty of self-employed workers is determined at the
margin through a market mechanism. It is no surprise to find a higher average
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evaluation of self-employment status than the evaluation of self-employment
status by the last worker who marginally becomes a self-employed worker.
The interpretation of the monetary value of self-employment status be-
comes more restricted for the fixed effects model. The coefficient θ1i is identi-
fied as those who changed self-employment status during the sample period,
since if sit is constant over sample period, the variable is perfectly multicol-
inear with s¯i and only θ1i + γ1 is identified for those observations. Thus the
estimated monetary value of self-employment status from the fixed effects
model is the average evaluation of self-employment status among workers
who experience a transition between a salary/wage job and a self-employed
job. As we can see from Table 6, there are more observations that transit
from a salary/wage job to a self-employed job, so it is not surprising to find
higher evaluations of self-employment status among workers who become self-
employed during the sample period. Those who leave self-employment might
also do so because of financial reasons but not because of job satisfaction.
These four considerations may well reconcile the estimated self-employment
penalty (20% of earnings for a worker with 10 years of job experience and 10
years of job tenure) with the estimated monetary value of self-employment
jobs (about 250%) in terms of job satisfaction.
7 Conclusion
Analyses of job satisfaction scores show that self-employed workers are more
satisfied with their jobs than salary/wage workers. Moreover, one dollar of
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earnings while a self-employed worker is equivalent to 2.5 dollars of earn-
ings while a salary/wage worker in terms of job satisfaction. This finding
is preserved even when individual heterogeneity, which is potentially corre-
lated with self-employment status, and the feedback effect, which runs from
current job satisfaction to future job change, are considered.
This high valuation of self-employment status in terms of job satisfaction
may overestimate the actual trade-off between self-employment status and
monetary income in terms of utility. However, even after taking the effect of
unavoidable overestimation into consideration, the value of self-employment
status in terms of job satisfaction, which is about 250% of other workers’
earnings, seems high enough to explain the lower earnings of self-employed
workers. Thus, the results obtained in this paper support the compensat-
ing differential hypothesis as an explanation for lower earnings among self-
employed workers.
Promising future research would develop a rigorous appraisal of the com-
pensating wage differential hypothesis by using a better measurement of util-
ity or principles of revealed preference.
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Table 1: Sample construction 
 Total Salary / 
Wage 
workers 
Self-
Employed 
Workers 
Original NLSY79 1985-1998 152232 – – 
Non Black and Non Hispanic 90120 – – 
Male 45480 – – 
    
Employed + out of school 24756 – – 
Work in private, government and self-employed 24580 – – 
Valid answer for job satisfaction: Sample (1) 24533 22095 2438 
    
Employed + out of school for two consecutive interviews 19893 – – 
Valid class + tenure variables 19402 – – 
Work in private, government and self-employed for two 
consecutive interviews 
19298 – – 
Valid answer for job satisfaction: Sample (2) 19222 17265 1957 
    
Sample (2) + lagged demographic variables are available: 
Sample (3) 
13889 12512 1377 
    
Sample (1) + valid covariate + more than 2 years of 
observation: Sample (4) 
20454 18585 1869 
    
Hourly wage/earnings are between 5 percentile and 95 
percentile: Sample (5) 
14199 13163 1036 
Note: 
Tenure variable is used to identify job change. Sample (1) is used in the analysis of Table 3. Sample (2) is 
used in the analysis of Table 6. Sample (3) is used in the analysis of Table 4 and Table 5. Sample (4) is 
used in the analysis of Table 2. Sample (5) is used in the analysis of Table 7. 
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Table 2: OLS regression coefficients 
Dependent variable: log hourly wage 
Sample: Non Black and Non Hispanic Male (Sample (4)) 
 (1) (2) 
 OLS Fixed 
Effects 
Self-employment -0.011 0.022 
 (0.030) (0.016) 
Married-Spouse present 0.093 0.056 
 (0.014) (0.010) 
Education 0.078 – 
 (0.003)  
Experience 0.047 0.109 
 (0.006) (0.010) 
Experience2 / 100 -0.068 -0.115 
 (0.028) (0.021) 
Tenure 0.046 0.029 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
Tenure2 / 100 -0.223 -0.186 
 (0.028) (0.021) 
Self-employment × (Married – Mean (Married))  -0.059 -0.000 
 (0.061) (0.028) 
Self-employment × (Education – Mean (Education)) -0.008 – 
 (0.012)  
Self-employment × (Experience – Mean (Experience)) -0.020 -0.024 
 (0.023) (0.013) 
Self-employment × (Experience2 / 100 – Mean (Experience2 / 100)) 0.115 0.080 
 (0.095) (0.053) 
Self-employment × (Tenure – Mean (Tenure)) -0.050 -0.027 
 (0.016) (0.009) 
Self-employment × (Tenure2 / 100 – Mean (Tenure2 / 100)) 0.221 0.194 
 (0.102) (0.058) 
Constant 5.162 – 
 (0.044)  
Observations 20454 20454 
R-squared 0.30 – 
Number of individuals 2661 2661 
   
Earnings differentials between self employed and Salary wage workers    
With 0 years of experience and 0 years of job (business) tenure 0.184 0.209 
 (0.128) (0.071) 
With 5 years of experience and 5 years of job (business) tenure -0.084 0.027 
 (0.064) (0.036) 
With 10 years of experience and 10 years of job (business) tenure -0.184 -0.018 
 (0.064) (0.037) 
 
Standard errors robust against panel clustering are in parentheses for OLS estimates. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis for F.E. estimates. 
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Table 3: 
Panel A Job satisfaction among salary/wage workers 
Sample: White Male (Sample (1)) 
year Like very 
much 
Row % 
Like fairly 
well 
Row % 
Dislike 
somewhat 
Row % 
Dislike very 
much 
Row % 
Total 
observation 
85 45.97 43.27 8.65 2.11 1849 
86 43.25 48.13       6.13       2.49 1926 
87 41.95 50.56       5.97       1.52 2043 
88 41.28 48.82       8.20       1.70 2122 
89 43.59 46.89       7.43       2.09 2154 
90 41.58 49.84         6.23 2.35 2167 
91 43.17 47.58       7.41       1.84 1633 
92 43.00 48.49       6.51       1.99 1658 
93 42.19 48.85       7.69       1.27 1652 
94 41.51 50.60       6.39       1.51 1660 
96 43.11 48.93       6.55       1.41 1633 
98 46.12 46.62       5.32       1.94 1598 
Total 43.00 48.24       6.89       1.87 22095 
 
Panel B: Job satisfaction among self-employed workers 
year Like very 
much 
Row % 
Like fairly 
well 
Row % 
Dislike 
somewhat 
Row % 
Dislike very 
much 
Row % 
Total 
observation 
85 72.61       22.29       3.18       1.91 157 
86 63.07       31.25       1.70       3.98 176 
87 59.90       36.04       2.54       1.52 197 
88 64.71       31.22       3.17       0.90 221 
89 64.38       33.48       1.72       0.43 233 
90 65.07       31.00       3.06       0.87 229 
91 70.05       26.40       2.54       1.02 197 
92 63.26       33.95       2.33       0.47 215 
93 63.59       33.98       1.94       0.49 206 
94 62.56       33.33       3.08       1.03 195 
96 74.52       22.60       2.40       0.48 208 
98 65.69       29.41       3.92       0.98 204 
Total 65.67       30.60       2.63       1.11 2438 
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Table 4: Probability to change job by the next interview (N=13884) 
Sample: Sample (3) 
Job satisfaction in the previous interview SW SE Mean
Dislike very much 0.388 0.267 0.379 
Dislike somewhat 0.256 0.383 0.263 
Like fairly well 0.178 0.206 0.179 
Like very much 0.148 0.108 0.143 
Total 0.173 0.153 0.171 
N 12512 1377 13889
Note: 
Sample is constructed to be consistent with the sample used for the job change regression. 
 
Table 5: Job change Probit model 
Dependent variable: Job Change between t and t-1(Yes=1; No=0) 
Sample: Sample (3) 
 (1) (2) 
Lagged job satisfaction: Dislike very much 0.250 0.243 
 (0.038) (0.038) 
Lagged job satisfaction: Dislike somewhat 0.127 0.124 
 (0.017) (0.017) 
Lagged job satisfaction: Like somewhat 0.037 0.036 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Lagged Self Employment -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Lagged SE × Lagged job satisfaction: Dislike very much -0.101 -0.112 
 (0.036) (0.032) 
Lagged SE × Lagged job satisfaction: Dislike somewhat -0.012 -0.029 
 (0.065) (0.061) 
Lagged SE × Lagged job satisfaction: Like somewhat 0.033 0.035 
 (0.027) (0.027) 
Lagged education -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Lagged experience -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Lagged tenure -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Lagged log wage  -0.026 
  (0.006) 
Observations 13884 13884 
Marginal effects of Probit model is presented.  
Robust standard errors against panel clustering are in parentheses.  
Lagged job satisfaction: like very much is the omitted category. 
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Table 6: Transition of job satisfaction associated with job change (Percentage) 
 (SE: Self-Employment Job, SW: Salary and Wage Job)  
Sample: White Male (Sample (2)) 
 Job Satisfaction in Previous Year 
 Like  
Very Much 
Like  
Fairly Well
Dislike  
Somewhat 
Dislike  
Very Much 
Job Satisfaction in Current Year     
SW in previous year     
Panel A: Job Stayers 
(salary/wage-salary/wage) N=13910 
    
Like Very Much 30.17 10.34 0.96 0.19 
Like fairly well 13.11 33.26 2.95 0.52 
Dislike somewhat 1.03 3.79 1.62 0.29 
Dislike Very Much 0.31 0.74 0.45 0.27 
Panel B: Job Stayers 
 (SE-SE) N=1327 
    
Like Very Much 54.56 9.87 0.38 0.15 
Like fairly well 13.49 17.71 0.75 0.30 
Dislike somewhat 0.53 0.75 0.60 0.15 
Dislike Very Much 0.08 0.30 0.23 0.15 
Panel C: Job Changers  
(salary/wage-salary/wage) N=2838 
    
Like Very Much 21.71 21.04 3.84 1.41 
Like fairly well 12.37 25.55 5.25 1.27 
Dislike somewhat 1.30 2.85 1.30 0.42 
Dislike Very Much 0.42 0.81 0.25 0.21 
Panel D: SE in previous year     
Job Changer 
(SE-SE) N=41 
    
Like Very Much 51.22 12.20 2.44 0.00 
Like fairly well 4.88 24.39 2.44 0.00 
Dislike somewhat 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.44 
Dislike Very Much – – – – 
Panel E: Job Changer 
(wage/salary-SE) N=589 
    
Like Very Much 40.41 23.09 3.23 0.85 
Like fairly well 7.13 17.15 2.89 0.68 
Dislike somewhat 1.19 1.87 0.51 0.17 
Dislike Very Much 0.17 0.51 0.17 0.00 
Panel F: Job Changer 
(SE-salary/wage) N=517 
    
Like Very Much 39.26 12.19 1.74 0.39 
Like fairly well 18.76 20.50 0.58 0.58 
Dislike somewhat 2.32 1.35 0.39 0.19 
Dislike Very Much 0.97 0.77 0.00 0.00 
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Table 7: The results of ordered probit estimation 
Dependent variable:  
“Like very much”=4, “like fairly well”=3, “dislike somewhat”=2, “dislike very much =1”  
Sample: Sample (5) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled 
Ordered 
Probit 
Pooled Ordered
Probit 
"Fixed Effect" 
Ordered Probit 
Test of Weak 
Exogeneity 
Self Employed 0.472 0.476 0.451 0.461 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.061) (0.067) 
Wage 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.035 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Married  – 0.041 -0.067 -0.066 
  (0.028) (0.031) (0.033) 
Education – 0.021 0.043 0.027 
  (0.007) (0.034) (0.040) 
Experience – 0.011 0.003 0.005 
  (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) 
Mean (self employed) – – 0.043 0.031 
   (0.098) (0.116) 
Mean (wage) – – 0.000 0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Mean (married) – – 0.176 0.178 
   (0.051) (0.054) 
Mean (education) – – -0.024 -0.009 
   (0.035) (0.040) 
Mean (experience) – – 0.007 0.006 
   (0.010) (0.011) 
Selft+1 – – – 0.003 
    (0.054) 
Hourly Waget+1 – – – 0.000 
    (0.000) 
Year dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
3rd Cut Point (µ3) -1.710 -1.502 -1.460 -1.477 
 (0.048) (0.095) (0.101) (0.106) 
2nd Cut Point (µ2) -0.987 -0.779 -0.736 -0.733 
 (0.043) (0.092) (0.099) (0.104) 
1st Cut Point (µ1) 0.551 0.765 0.810 0.807 
 (0.044) (0.094) (0.100) (0.105) 
Monetary Value of SE 2.513 2.542 2.510 2.556 
 (0.281) (0.341) (0.362) (0.385) 
Observations 14199 14199 14199 12823 
Log Likelihood -13877 -13831 -13819 -12459 
Note: Panel clustering robust standard errors are in parenthesis for pooled ordered probit estimates. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis for "Fixed Effects" effect ordered probit estimates. Married dummy is 
one if married and spouse present, zero otherwise. Monetary value of self-employment status is calculated 
by  1+(coefficient for self-employment)/(coefficient for log wage×average hourly rate of pay). Standard 
error for this value is calculated through bootstrapping of 500 repetitions. 
